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I visited Teddy today at St. Vincent's. It's very depressing ....
He's lying there in bed, out of it....
Jimmy died, as you must have heard. I went out to San
Francisco to be with him the last few weeks. You must have
heard that, too. He was in a coma for a month....
Harry has K.S.,1 and Matt has the swollen glands. He
went in for tests today. . . I haven't slept well for weeks.
Every morning I examine my body for swellings, marks. I'm
terrified of every pimple, every rash.... I feel the disease clos-
ing in on me. All my activities are life and death. Keep up my
Blue Cross. Up my reps. Eat my vegetables.
Sometimes I'm so scared I go back on my resolutions: I
drink too much, and I smoke a joint, and I find myself at the
bars and clubs, where I stand around and watch. They remind
me of accounts of Europe during the Black Plague: coupling in
the dark, dancing till you drop. The New Wave is the corpse
look. I'm very frightened .... 2
A new "horror"3 has invaded our civilized society. Dubbed
AIDS, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome has killed
thousands4 and infected hundreds of thousands, perhaps even mil-
* Susan McGuigan will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota
Law School in 1987.
1. Kaposi's Sarcoma: a rare malignant tumor that usually manifests itself with
purple lesions on the skin. Victor Gong, Understanding AIDS 193 (1985).
2. William Hoffman, As Is 7-8 (1985) (quote from the character Saul).
3. In Zaire, the people have adopted "Horror" as the name for AIDS. Ann Gi-
udici Fettner & William Check, The Truth about AIDS: Evolution of an Epidemic
171 (rev. ed. 1985).
4. Through the end of 1986, 29,003 cases of AIDS have been reported to the
Center for Disease Control (CDC). Of that number, 16,301 have died. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Jan. 18, 1987, at 1F, col. 5. For a weekly compilation of statistics,
see, e.g., Center for Disease Control [hereinafter CDC], U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Table I. Summary-Cases Specified Notifiable Diseases, United
States, 35 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. [hereinafter MMWR] 614 (1986). A
compilation of data through 1985 can be found in CDC, Update: Acquired Immu-
nodefwiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MMWR 17 (1986) [hereinafter Update].
Experts project that by the year 1991, the number of AIDS cases will have in-
creased to 270,000 and the cumulative number of deaths will have reached 179,000.
Cootfont Report A PHS Plan for Prevention and Control of AIDS and the AIDS
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lions.5 With minimal resources and little government support, a
cure continues to elude researchers. Since homosexual and bisex-
ual men presently constitute almost 73% of the reported cases,
6
this deadly condition affects not only its victims and their loved
ones, but particularly threatens the gay community as a whole.
Within the past fifteen years, great strides have been made in les-
bian and gay rights. Homosexuals have gradually begun to "come
out" by making their sexual orientation known to the public, gay
rights organizations have formed across the nation,7 state and local
governments have passed equal rights legislation for homosexu-
als,8 and litigation by homosexuals in the fields of child custody,
adoption, federal taxes, employment discrimination, and immigra-
tion has increased in astounding numbers.9 Of principal impor-
tance to the gay rights movement are the significant achievements
in the decriminalization of private consensual sodomy.' 0 Yet with
Virus, 101 Pub. Health Reps. 341, 342 (1986) [hereinafter Coolfont Report]. The
above projections may in fact be underestimated by at least 20%. Id.
5. Anywhere from 1 to 1.5 million people may already carry the virus. Cool-
font Report, supra note 4, at 343. Persons affected by the AIDS virus can be di-
vided into three groups: those meeting the CDC definition of AIDS, those showing
symptoms of AIDS-related complex (ARC), and those testing seropositive for AIDS
antibodies. See infra notes 128 & 179. The later group is by far the largest.
6. Update, supra note 4, at 18. This figure includes a number of people who
are both homosexual/bisexual and intravenous (I.V.) drug users. Of the remaining
cases, 17% are heterosexual I.V. drug users, 2% are blood transfusion recipients, 4%
are heterosexual cases, 1% are hemophiliacs, and 3% are not classified in the above
high risk groups. Minneapolis Star & Trib., Jan. 18, 1984, at 4F, col. 4.
The designation "high risk group" means that persons are at risk of getting the
disease, not that they present a risk to others who do not have the disease. Fettner
& Check, supra note 3, at 114. Nevertheless, it is actually certain behaviors, not
specific groups of people, that promote transmission of the virus. Gays who prac-
tice safe sex, see infra note 160 and accompanying text, and I.V. drug users who do
not share unsterilized needles are not practicing high risk behaviors, yet are contin-
ually categorized with those who do. Categorizing in this manner, while probably
convenient for statistical purposes, tends to encourage "status" discrimination while
doing nothing to advance prevention by curbing high risk behavior. Certain re-
searchers have also concluded that the term "high-risk" groups should be aban-
doned. Minneapolis Star & Trib., Feb. 20, 1987, at 14A, col. 1.
7. See Thomas Stoddard, The Rights of Gay People app. E (rev. ed. 1983).
8. Wisconsin has the only state law which prohibits discrimination by both
public and private entities on the basis of sexual orientation. Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 111.31-.395 (West Supp. 1986). Numerous cities give protection to homosexuals in
such areas as employment, housing, and education. See Hayden Curry & Denis
Clifford, A Legal Guide for Lesbian and Gay Couples app. 1 (3d ed. 1985).
9. See generally Rhonda Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Posi-
tion of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L.J. 799 (1979) [here-
inafter Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges]; Rhonda Rivera, Recent Developments
in Sexual Preference Law, 30 Drake L. Rev. 311 (1980); Rhonda Rivera, Queer Law:
Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties; Part 1, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 459
(1985); Rhonda Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties;
Part 11, 11 U. Dayton L. Rev. 275 (1986).
10. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Since state statutes differ as to
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the onslaught of AIDS, progress has come to a halt and possibly
even taken a step backwards. AIDS hysteria, igniting ever-present
homophobic attitudes, has sharply increased the instances of em-
ployment and housing discrimination against gays," has conve-
niently provided the government with a mechanism to weed
homosexuals out of the military,12 and has prompted insurance
companies to withdraw coverage for victims of AIDS and to refuse
coverage for members of high risk groups.13 Then, as if the disease
were not burden enough, AIDS has been proposed as a justifica-
tion for upholding or even reinstating legislation criminalizing sod-
omy, the primary form of sexual expression between
the definition of sodomy and the persons to whom the statutes apply, this article
uses the term sodomy to include both oral and anal sex whether practiced by homo-
sexuals or heterosexuals. Heterosexual or homosexual sodomy will be specified
when a distinction is necessary.
Numerous state statutes use the archaic term "crime against nature" to de-
scribe sodomy. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 131411 (West 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 14.89 (West 1986). This term perpetuates Blackstone's prejudice that sodomy is
both unnatural and immoral. "Deviate" sexual conduct or intercourse is another
common term used in sodomy statutes. E.g., Ala. Code § 13A-6-60 (1982); N.Y. Pe-
nal Law § 130.00(2) (McKinney 1975). Although deviate means a departure from
the norm, it also connotes a sexual perversity which is judgmental and inappropri-
ate. See David Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:
A Moral Theory, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1281 (1977). This article will use the more
neutral term of sodomy.
11. See Robert Burns, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 Akron L. Rev. 719 (1984);
Charles Eisnaugle, New York State Division of Human Rights AIDS Based Dis-
crimination: A Summary of Reported Instances, January 1984-October 1985, in
AIDS & Drug Abuse in the Workplace: Resolving the Thorny Legal-Medical Issues
286 (Charles Bakaly, Jr. & Saul Kramer eds. 1986); see also Arthur Leonard, Em-
ployment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 681
(1985); Arthur Leonard, Aids and Employment Law Revisited, 14 Hofstra L. Rev.
11 (1985).
Numerous California cities prohibit AIDS-based discrimination. E.g., Los An-
geles, Cal., Municipal Code, art. 5.8, §§ 45.80-.93 (1985); San Francisco, Cal., Munici-
pal Code, pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 38, §§ 3801-3816 (1985). To date, no state has taken
such initiative.
12. See John Parry, AIDS as a Handicapping Condition, 9 Mental & Physical
Disability L. Rep. 402, 404 (1985). Presently, the Defense Department requires that
all recruits and current military personnel be tested for AIDS. Recruits who test
positively for AIDS-virus antibodies are rejected. Martin Schneiderman, AIDS and
Employment: Federal Employees, the Military, and the Washington Metropolitan
Area (D.C, VA.,MD.), in AIDS-Legal Aspects of a Medical Crisis 347, 353 (Eleanor
Alter ed. 1986).
13. See Fettner & Check, supra note 3, at 214. Because of the high cost of
AIDS claims, insurers are attempting to use the ELISA test, see infra notes 136-138
and accompanying text, and detailed questionaires about AIDS exposure to elimi-
nate high risk individuals from insurance coverage. Howard Saks, Impact of Aids
on Life Insurance Industry, 13 Est. Plan. 57 (1986). But see American Council of
Life Ins. v. District of Columbia, 645 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1986) (statute prohibiting
insurer from denying or cancelling coverage to persons testing positively for the
AIDS virus upheld against insurance company challenge).
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homosexuals. 14 The Supreme Court's rulings in Bowers v. Hard-
wick 15 and Baker v. Wade 16 will significantly affect the gay and
lesbian rights movement.17 The role AIDS played in its outcome is
uncertain. The role AIDS should have played is the catalyst for
this article.
Initially, this article summarizes the history of present atti-
tudes toward homosexuality and sodomy. Next, it explores the sig-
nificant challenges to state sodomy statutes and the grounds
offered by states to defend these statutes. Finally, after presenting
a factual summary of the AIDS epidemic, it analyzes both the
criminal law and public health reaction to the AIDS crisis, con-
cluding that the regulation of private consensual sodomy through
the criminal law, even under the guise of a public health measure,
is an inappropriate solution to the AIDS dilemma.
II. Historical Perspective
"If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be
put to death; their blood shall be upon them."' 8 Through the cen-
turies, these few words have elicited condemnation of homosexual-
ity and, as a consequence, prohibition of sodomy.19 Although
initially the early church punished those practicing the "heresy" of
homosexuality,20 the British government eventually adopted the
Judeo-Christian view of sodomy and proscribed by statute "the in-
famous crime against nature, committed either with man or
14. See infra notes 144-152 and accompanying text.
15. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
16. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), supplemented by 106 F.R.D. 526 (N.D.
Tex. 1985), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
17. Citing Hardwick as authority, the Missouri Supreme Court has ruled that
the state's "deviate sexual intercourse" act violated neither the defendant's right to
privacy nor equal protection under the law. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo.
1986).
18. Leviticus 20:13 (King James). See also Leviticus 18:22; Romans 1:26-27. The
word sodomy apparently originated in reference to certain homosexual acts com-
mitted by the inhabitants of the city of Sodom. See Genesis 19:4-12; Deuteronomy
23:17.
19. Although the Bible makes no reference to sodomy between females, later
proscriptions of sodomy have usually included lesbian sexual conduct. See John
McNeill, The Church and the Homosexual 83-87 (1976), cited in Craig Pearson, The
Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U.
Tol. L. Rev. 811, 815 (1984).
20. Kenneth Lasson, Homosexual Rights: The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 U.
Bait. L. Rev. 47, 51 (1979). The early Church viewed sodomy as a sin against God,
since it was contrary to the Church's belief that the sole purpose of semen emission
was procreation. Pearson, supra note 19, at 816 (citing Thomas Aquinas, On the




beast."21 In the United States, every state, at one time or other,
has criminalized sodomy.22 Since the 1960's, however, a trend to-
ward eliminating the statutory proscription of private consensual
sodomy has been established.23 Both the legislative and judicial
branches of state government have contributed to the gradual
decriminalization of sodomy.24 Even now, concerned individuals
21. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *215 (emphasis in original).
22. Bennett Wolff, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. Rev.
1279, 1281 (1981). Initially only anal sex was prohibited. Gradually most states pro-
scribed both anal and oral sex by heterosexuals and homosexuals.
23. In 1955, the American Law Institute recommended that criminal statutes
regulating sexual conduct be recast in such a way as to remove legal penalties for
acts performed in private among consenting adults. Model Penal Code § 207.5 com-
ment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), adopted in Model Penal Code § 213.2 revised com-
ments (Off. Draft 1980). The British followed suit, releasing the Wolfendon Report,
which urged that laws regulating private morality be repealed. Committee on Ho-
mosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report, Cmd. No. 247, at 115 (1957) [hereinaf-
ter Wolfendon Report], quoted in Robert Harris, Jr., Private Consensual Adult
Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14
UCLA L. Rev. 581, 583 (1967). In 1973, a section of the American Bar Association
also recommended the repeal of all laws classifying non-commercial, private con-
sensual sexual conduct between adults as criminal. Recommendation and Report to
the House of Delegates by the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities
Concerning Consenting Adult Sexual Conduct, 4 Hum. Rts. 67 (1974). Two years
later, the American Medical Association supported an almost identical resolution.
The American Psychiatric Association had previously removed homosexuality from
its list of psychic disorders, stating that "homosexuality per se does not constitute
any form of mental disease". Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex.
1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
24. Twenty-three states have legislatively decriminalized private consensual
sodomy: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges supra note 9, at 950-51.
Several state courts have declared that statutes prohibiting sodomy are uncon-
stitutional or inapplicable to private consensual sodomy. See Commonwealth v.
Bonado, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (improper exercise of police power and vio-
lation of equal protection); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415
N.E.2d 936 (1980) (violation of right to privacy and equal protection, and invalid ex-
ercise of police power), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Wasson,
No. 86M859 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Oct. 13, 1986) (violation of Kentucky's constitutional
right to privacy); State v. Gray, No. 3103327 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 1, 1986) (violation
of Minnesota's constitutional right to privacy). Cf. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986) ("crime against nature" does not include private consen-
sual heterosexual sodomy; the issue as to the statutes' application to homosexual
sodomy was not reached by the court), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 290 (1986); Common-
wealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974) ("unnatural and lascivious
act" does not apply to private consensual sexual conduct between adults). But see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986) (Constitution does not "confer a
right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy."), rev'd, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th
Cir. 1985); Baker, 769 F.2d 289 (sodomy statute did not violate right to privacy or
equal protection under the law); Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (Mis-
souri statute does not deprive homosexuals of a right to privacy or equal
protection).
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and organizations continue to challenge sodomy statutes.25
Given this progress, it is anomalous that sodomy statutes con-
tinue to remain in effect. In actuality, the majority of sodomy stat-
utes are rarely enforced and, if enforced, involve either sodomy by
force or in public26-acts generally prohibited under rape and pub-
lic indecency or lewdness statutes. Although most statutes pro-
hibit both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, heterosexuals
are seldom prosecuted; the primary target of law enforcement offi-
cials are gay men.27 The law's mere existence labels homosexuals
as criminals, causing anxiety and emotional distress. 28 In essence,
sodomy laws criminalize the homosexual's primary means of sex-
ual expression. While heterosexuals have the opportunity to "le-
gitimize" their sexual relationships through marriage (if, in fact,
fornication laws made those relationships illegal), homosexuals
have no such option.29 Considering the unequal treatment of
homosexuals and heterosexuals, the intimacy of the acts involved,
and the general nonenforcement of the statutes, it is no wonder
that the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting sodomy in private
between consenting adults, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
has been questioned.
III. Challenges to Sodomy Statutes
As the lesbian/gay rights movement has grown, challenges to
sodomy statutes have also increased. 30 Opponents of the statutes
25. The Lambda Legal Defense Fund has established an Ad Hoc Task Force
Against Sodomy Laws to handle all challenges to sodomy statutes.
26. Ralph Slovenko, Foreword: The Homosexual and Society: A Historical Per-
spective, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 445, 447 (1985). Due to constitutional restraints on
search and seizure, and the evidentiary requirement of corroborating testimony,
most sodomy statutes are practically unenforceable. Randy Von Beitel, The
Criminalization of Private Homosexual Acts: A Jurisprudential Case Study of a
Decision by the Texas Bar Penal Code Revision Committee, 6 Hum. Rts. 23, 51-52
(1977).
27. Kathryn Humphrey, The Right of Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws
Regulating Private Consensual Behavior, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 1067, 1070 (1979). It
should be noted that seven state statutes proscribe only homosexual sodomy: Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 41-1813 (1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1985); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1985); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); Mont. Code
Ann. § 45-5-505 (1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1986); Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
28. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1130. See also Harris, supra note 23, at 581; Von
Beitel, supra note 26, at 51.
29. See David Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Pri-
vacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 Hastings
L.J. 957, 1006 (1979); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homo-
sexuality as a Suspect Classifiction, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1305 n.101 (1985).
30. See supra notes 24, 25.
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have attacked them from many angles,3 1 but a focus on the equal
protection clause and the right to privacy had proved to be the
most successful approach.3 2 Although the right to privacy was
originally limited to the context of marriage,33 Eisenstadt v.
Baird3 4 broadened this right to protect "the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government
intrusion ... ."35 While expressing "no opinion on the constitution-
ality of the Georgia statute as applied to [heterosexual] sodomy,"3 6
31. Sodomy statutes have been challenged as: (1) a violation of the eighth
amendment restriction against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Kenneth
Lasson, Civil Liberties for Homosexuals: The Law in Limbo, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev.
645, 659 (1985); Pearson, supra note 19, at 863; (2) unconstitutional on vagueness
grounds. See, e.g., Debra Barnhart, Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate
Sexual Intercourse-A Comparative Analysis, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 253, 271 (1981);
Pearson, supra note 19, at 860; (3) a violation of the establishment clause. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1145 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986); Harris, supra note 23, at 600; Pearson,
supra note 21, at 860; (4) an intrusion on first amendment freedom of speech and
association. See, e.g., Lasson, supra, at 660; Note, supra note 29, at 1293; and (5) as
unconstitutionally overbroad. See, e.g., Barnhart, supra, at 270; James Rizzo, The
Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 Fordlham L. Rev. 553, 561 (1976). Gener-
ally, however, courts have summarily dismissed these challenges. But see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (a long prison sen-
tence for a single private, consensual act of sodomy "would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue"). For an extensive list of cases employing these and other
grounds for attacking sodomy statutes, see Annotation, Validity of Statute Making
Sodomy a Criminal Offense, 20 A.L.R.4th 1009 (1983).
32. A third line of inquiry involves the improper extension of the state's police
power. Though courts have interpreted the constitution to give states the power to
formulate regulations to promote the health, safety, welfare and morals of the peo-
ple, the state must justify the imposition of its authority by showing that "the inter-
ests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, [must]
require such interference and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), quoted in Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490
Pa. 91, 95, 415 A.2d 47, 49 (1980).
33. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. Id. at 453. For an in-depth analysis of the applicability of the right of pri-
vacy to relationships beyond the confines of marriage, see Kenneth Karst, The Free-
dom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 652 (1980) ("The logic of the freedom
of intimate association .. .cannot be contained at the status boundaries of formal
marriage .. "); Richards, supra note 29, at 1003 ("Sexuality... is not a spiritually
empty experience that the state may compulsorily legitimize only in the form of
rigid, marital, procreational sex .... ); Richard Saphire, Gay Rights and the Consti-
tution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice, and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10
U. Dayton L. Rev. 767, 790 (1985) ("[T]he marriage relationship has been protected
because it is a form of society through which individuals express and live out a con-
ception of intimacy, loyalty, commitment and love. There is no reason . . .why
these human capacities and aspirations cannot be developed and expressed in other
forms of society than a traditional, heterosexual marriage.") See also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985) (intimate association does not exist in
marital relationships alone). 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
36. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. at 2842 n.2.
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in Bowers v. Hardwick the Supreme Court concluded that since
there is "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other," neither
precedent nor traditional values permitted extending the right to
privacy to consensual homosexual sodomy.3 7
The Court in Hardwick did not, however, address the equal
protection question presented by the Georgia statute.38 Since the
rational basis test is generally equivalent to an automatic affirm-
ance of a challenged statute's constitutionality, a statute will be
struck down under an equal protection analysis39 only if a court
applies a strict scrutiny test. A court will apply the strict scrutiny
standard only if it finds that sodomy statutes either discriminate
against homosexuals as a suspect class or impinge upon homosexu-
als' fundamental rights. While no court has yet classified homo-
sexuals as a suspect class, nor used the semisuspect classification
applied in gender discrimination cases,4 0 a strong argument can be
made that homosexuals meet all of the essential criteria.4
37. Id. at 2844.
38. Although the Georgia statute literally applies to both heterosexual and ho-
mosexual sodomy, see Ga. Code Ann. § 16-62(a) (1984), the Georgia Attorney Gen-
eral admitted the statute's unconstitutionality as applied to married couples and
argued its validity only as to homosexuals. See Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 n.10.
But see Williams v. State, 494 So.2d 819 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (sodomy statute's
marital exemption had no rational basis and violated the equal protection clause).
39. Initially, to invoke the equal protection clause, the court must find that the
statute creates a classification. Statutes which distinguish between homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy, see supra note 25, or married and unmarried people, e.g.,
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3505 (1981); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3124 (Purdon 1983), sat-
isfy this requirement. If the language of the statute applies equally to all, it may be
shown that the law is discriminatory as applied by proving a disparate enforcement
against homosexuals. See Sandra Grove, Constitutionality of Minnesota's Sodomy
Law, 2 Law & Inequality 521, 544 (1984); Pearson, supra note 19, at 846. See also
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2850 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Georgia's exclusive stress before the Court on its interest in prosecuting homo-
sexual activity despite the gender-neutral terms of the statute may raise serious
questions of discriminatory enforcement .. "). But see Pearson, supra note 19, at
852; Annotation, supra note 31, at 1053, 1055.
40. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1144 n.58 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (if asked to
decide the issue, the court would have held that homosexuals are not a suspect
class), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (the court declined to hold "that
homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect classification"), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3337 (1986); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 510-11 (Mo. 1986) (prohibition of
homosexual activity is neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect classification).
41. For a class to be deemed suspect, members must satisfy four requirements:
(1) Traits defining the class are immutable and beyond the member's control;
(2) The class is the reflection of prejudice rather than rational judgment regarding
the member's abilities; (3) The class is a politically powerless minority; and (4) The
class has suffered from a history of purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., Richard
Delgado, Fact, Norm and Standard of Review-YThe Case of Homosexuality, 10 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 575, 583 (1985); Harris Miller II, An Argument for the Application
of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to COassifications Based on Homosexual-
[Vol. 4:545
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Since state courts have dealt with contests to sodomy statutes
in various ways, thoroughly investigating their analyses will shed
light on both future challenges to sodomy statutes and the possible
effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.42
A. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
The first significant challenge to a state sodomy statute was
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.43 In a declaratory judgment ac-
tion brought by several adult males, a U.S. District Court found
that Virginia's statute prohibiting "crimes against nature" was not
unconstitutional. The majority, relying primarily on Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,44 concluded that the right of
privacy was inapplicable to homosexual sodomy: "[W]e cannot say
that the statute offends the Bill of Rights or any other of the
Amendments and the wisdom or policy is a matter for the State's
resolve."45 The statute's longevity, along with the state's interest
in promoting morality and decency, served to rationally support
the Virginia statute. Judge Merhige, in his dissent, chastised the
majority for narrowly interpretating the right of privacy. The
right to select consenting adult sexual partners fell within the pri-
vacy rights protected by the Due Process Clause, said Judge Mer-
hige, and absent a compelling state interest, the statute was
unconstitutional.46
The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district
court's opinion, giving the judgment binding precedential effect.47
Nevertheless, the decision has left other jurisdictions unsure as to
ity, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797, 812 (1984); Pearson, supra note 19, at 849. For a thor-
ough discussion of the categorization of homosexuals as a suspect class, see Miller,
supra, at 813-34; Note, supra note 29, at 1299-1305. See also Rowland v. Mad River
Local School District, 105 S.Ct. 1373, 1377 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("First,
homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority.... [M]embers of this
group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena.
Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sus-
tained hostility, and... discrimination against homosexuals is 'likely... to reflect
deep-seated prejudice rather than ... rationality.' (cite omitted) State action taken
against members of such groups based simply on their status as members of the
group traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least heightened, scru-
tiny .... ), denying cert. to 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
42. 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986).
43. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
44. 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Thus, I would not suggest
that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal en-
quiry, however privately practiced.")
45. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200. The court did not, however, directly address the
equal protection question.
46. Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
47. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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whether the Court's rationale supported the Virginia court's con-
clusion that private consensual sodomy fell outside the right of pri-
vacy or whether it based its decision on a lack of standing.48 The
significance of the Doe affirmance has become moot, however,
since the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick decided the question on the
merits of Hardwick's case "rather than rely on our earlier action
in Doe."49
B. Commonwealth v. Bonadio
In Commonwealth v. Bonadio,50 the Court overturned the
convictions of two "exotic" dancers and held that Pennsylvania's
Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute violated the right of
equal protection and the state's police power. "[T]he police power
should properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to
be free from interferences in defining and pursuing his own moral-
ity but not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose con-
duct does not harm others."5 ' Moreover, the court held that while
the application of strict scrutiny was not necessary, a statute for-
bidding "deviate sexual intercourse" when performed by unmar-
ried persons but not by married persons lacked even a rational
basis under the equal protection clause.5 2
C. People v. Onofre
The court in People v. Onofre 53 concluded that the New York
consensual sodomy statute violated the defendants' (one hetero-
sexual and two homosexual couples) right to privacy and equal
protection under the law and constituted an improper exercise of
the state's police power.5 4 The state failed to demonstrate a ra-
tional basis for excluding decisions "to seek sexual gratification
from what ... once was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct"
48. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 493, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953-54, 415
N.E.2d 936, 943 (1980) (a contrary result is not compelled by Doe; affirmance may
have been predicated on a lack of standing), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Baker
v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1137-38 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (little if any weight should be
given to the summary affirmance), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986); Bowers v. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202, 1208 (11th Cir. 1985) (con-
strue Doe as an affirmance based on the plaintiff's lack of standing), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2841 (1986). But see Baker, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (decision of the
Supreme Court in Doe was on the merits of the case).
49. 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2843 n.4 (1986).
50. 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
51. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50.
52. Id. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.





from the right to privacy, as long as they were voluntary, non-com-
mercial and in private.55 In addition, the state had not demon-
strated any legitimate justification which "rationally explain[ed]
the different treatment accorded married and unmarried per-
sons."58 Finally, since the state had not offered a substantial show-
ing of harm, its goal of preventing harm and preserving morality
was an invalid exercise of police power. 57
The dissent objected to extending the right of privacy, con-
cluding that the Supreme Court decisions to date did not establish
"an undifferentiated right to unfettered sexual expression." 58 The
continuous and unbroken history of sodomy statutes, according to
the dissent, was reason enough to uphold state regulation of pri-
vate consensual sodomy.59
D. Baker v. Wade
Despite the state's offer of morality, health, and procreation
as state interests, the trial court in Baker v. Wade6 0 concluded
that "the right of privacy.., does extend to private sexual conduct
between consenting adults (whether heterosexual or homosex-
ual)"61 and that the statute was neither justified by a compelling
state interest nor rationally related to a legitimate state interest.62
Likewise, "widespread public distaste" did not justify the overt dis-
crimination between homosexuals and heterosexuals. 63
In 1985, the court of appeals reversed the lower court.64 The
court stated that the Doe decision controlled the right of privacy
question.65 In addition, the state's claim that the public's strong
objection to homosexual conduct served as a justification was not
"totally unrelated to the pursuit of implementing morality, a per-
missible state goal" under an equal protection analysis.66
55. Id. at 488, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41.
56. Id. at 491, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953, 415 N.E.2d at 942 (quoting Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972)).
57. Id. at 492, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953, 415 N.E.2d at 943.
58. Id. at 498, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 956-57, 415 N.E.2d at 946 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 504, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 960, 415 N.E.2d at 949 (Grabrielli, J., dissenting).
60. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986). Baker, a former Dallas school teacher, brought suit
against the state seeking to have the Texas statute which prohibits homosexual sod-
omy declared unconstitutional.
61. Id. at 1140.
62. Id. at 1143.
63. Id. at 1145.
64. Baker, 769 F.2d at 289. The Supreme Court has since denied the plaintiff's
petition for writ of certiorari. 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).




E. Bowers v. Hardwick
Clearly, the most influential challenge to a sodomy statute is
Bowers v. Hardwick.67 After concluding that Hardwick had stand-
ing to bring the action against the state, the court of appeals held
that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe did not pre-
clude a finding that Georgia's sodomy statute implicated the funda-
mental right of privacy.68 In fact, Supreme Court actions since
Doe had encouraged the reconsideration of this primary question.69
The court of appeals remanded the case, giving the state an oppor-
tunity to prove that the statute promoted a compelling state
interest.70
The Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick deviated sharply
from the Court's prior analysis of the fundamental right to pri-
vacy. Not only did the Court decline to consider both the equal
protection and eighth amendment questions, but it refused to ex-
tend or interpret its past decisions to include the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy within the right to privacy.71 In addition, the
Court held that "majority sentiments about the morality of homo-
sexuality" constituted a state interest sufficient to uphold Geor-
gia's statute.72
IV. State Interests
In any constitutional analysis, whether it involves an equal
protection violation, right to privacy claim, or a police power ques-
tion, the focus of the court's review must be the sufficiency of the
state's interest. The inadequacy of the justifications thus far ad-
vanced by the states regulating sodomy leads to the conclusion
that absent a more compelling justification, statutes prohibiting
private consensual sodomy must be abolished.73
67. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
68. Id. at 1212.
69. Id. at 1208-10 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17
(1977); People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983),
cert. granted, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), cert dismissed, 467 U.S. 246 (1984)).
70. Id. at 1213.
71. 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
72. Id. at 2846.
73. Though states offer numerous justifications for sodomy statutes, in many
cases the actual reason for the continuous prohibition of sodomy is the fear that the
decriminalization of sodomy will be construed as state approval of a "deviate" sex-
ual practice. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 489, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951, 415 N.E.2d
936, 941 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). See also Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1134 n.30 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986); Harris, supra note 23, at 595; Von Beitel, supra note 26,
at 49. A statute's longevity does not justify impeding the potential for the growth




The primary goal advanced by state governments to justify
the criminalization of private consensual sodomy is the protection
of morality. The Constitution has been interpreted to grant states
the power "to prevent misuses of property or rights which impair
the health, safety, or morals of others," 74 and in turn, "maintain a
decent society." 75 In his book The Enforcement of Morals,76 Lord
Patrick Devlin claims that the criminal law must protect the "rec-
ognized morality" of its citizenry. 77 If a particular behavior falls
outside that recognized morality, Devlin insists that it be prohib-
ited by law.
Expressing the opposing viewpoint, John Stuart Mill asserts
that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others."78 Mill goes on to say that any thought or
behavior having no deleterious effect on others may not be regu-
lated by the criminal law. 79 The harm must be probable rather
than merely possible and must affect others or society as a whole.
Harm to the individual actor is insufficient to justify government
regulation. It is Mill's belief that an individual:
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will
be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
74. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 375 (1926).
75. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1973) (quoting Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)). The state may legitimately prohibit offensive pub-
lic displays of sexual behavior, any kind of forceful sexual contact, abuse and cor-
ruption of minors, and cruelty to animals-all under the guise of protecting morals.
See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 95, 415 A.2d 47, 49 (1980). But see Note,
supra note 29, at 1308 (prohibition of incest and polygamy because of perceived im-
morality may be unjustified).
76. Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965).
77. The "recognized morality" is ascertained by considering the depth of socie-
tal disgust for the behavior, the existence of a "real feeling of reprobation," the be-
lief that the behavior is abominable, and the genuineness of that belief. See Steven
Ludd, The Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: In Search of the Right
to be Let Alone, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 705, 714 (1985).
78. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Three Essays 15 (1975).
79.
And it is foolish to say, that Government is concerned to meddle with
the private Thoughts and Actions of Men, while they injure neither
the Society, nor any of its Members. Every Man is, in Nature and Rea-
son, the Judge and Disposer of his own domestic Affairs; and, accord-
ing to the Rules of Religion and Equity, every Man must carry his own
Conscience.... Government being intended to protect Men from the
injuries of one another, and not to direct them in their own Affairs, in
which no one is interested but themselves; it is plain, that their
Thoughts and domestic Concerns are exempted intirely from its
Jurisdiction.
The English Libertarian Heritage 127, 129 (D. Jacobsen ed. 1965), quoted in Ludd,
supra note 77, at 707.
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because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with
him, or reasoning with him,... but not for compelling him, or
visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must
be calculated to produce evil to some one else.8 0
The Wolfendon Report reiterates Mill's philosophy, stating that
crime cannot be equated with sin and that the area of private mo-
rality is "not the law's business."8 1
Accepting, for the sake of argument, that the state should
protect the morality of its people, it must first decide which set of
moral values it should defend. Should the law prohibit what the
"majority" regards as immoral?8 2 Although most of the criminal
law may reflect fundamental moral standards, it does not serve the
law's purposes for a select percentage of the population to regulate
private consensual behavior. Moreover, majority standards
change. "Yesterday's perversion is today's experiment and per-
haps tomorrow's matter of taste."8 3 When the prevailing morality
changes, the laws regulating those morals must also change.
Furthermore, using morality rather than injury to others as
the basis for criminal law provides little proof of the law's effec-
tiveness. There is little, if any, evidence that such legislation safe-
guards society's morals-or that it does not.8 4 To legitimately
regulate behavior reflecting a set of moral values, it must also be
shown that the questionable behavior directly causes an identifi-
able harm either to others or to society as a whole. In applying
this principle to sodomy statutes, the American Law Institute con-
cluded that private consensual sodomy did not result in mental or
physical danger to the health and safety of the participants or to
the secular interests of the community and, therefore, should not
be prohibited.8 5 Moral proscription without conceivable harm can-
80. Mill, supra note 78, at 15. Human liberty, according to Mill, consists of
three aspects: first, liberty of conscience, of thought and feeling, of opinions and ex-
pression of those opinions; second, liberty of tastes and pursuits, "of framing the
plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like,... without impedi-
ment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong"; and third, "free-
dom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others." Id. at 18.
81. Wolfendon Report, supra note 23, at 24.
82. Generally, the source of the majority view is Biblical and theological teach-
ings. Laws enforcing these teachings often raise an establishment clause question.
See Pearson, supra note 19, at 860.
83. Harris, supra note 23, at 595.
84. See Rizzo, supra note 31, at 584-85. See generally Richards, supra note 29,
at 982-88.
85. See Model Penal Code, supra note 23.
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not satisfy even the rational basis test.8 6
Courts have ruled on both sides of the harm requirement
question. The court in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney8 7 ignored
the ALI's recommendation and held that, even absent proof that
homosexuality led to moral delinquency, promoting morality and
decency was a legitimate state interest.8 8 The court conceded that
it arrived at this conclusion simply because it would be impractica-
ble to prove that harm took place.8 9 Although the lower court in
Baker v. Wade concluded that assertions of general platitudes of
morality and decency were inadequate to justify the Texas sodomy
statute, 90 the Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that the promotion of
morality was a permissible state goal.91 Also in agreement was the
Missouri Supreme Court, holding in State v. Walsh 92 that imple-
menting and promoting public morality is a permissible state
goal. 93
On the other hand, in People v. Onofre, the court stated that
the penal law's function was not "to provide either a medium for
the articulation or the apparatus for the intended enforcement of
moral or theological values."94 The court held that since the gov-
ernment made no showing that private consensual sodomy posed a
threat, either to the participants or to the general public, the stat-
ute furthered no legitimate state interest.95 The Pennsylvania
court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio held that morality was not a
sufficient state interest to justify the prohibition of sodomy with-
out a showing of harm to others.96 A "natural repugnance" toward
"abnormal sexual acts" did not constitute a compelling state inter-
est for the courts to justify Oklahoma's sodomy statute in Post v.
State .97
The Supreme Court in Hardwick found that the majority of
the population's view that "homosexual sodomy is immoral and
86. See Rizzo, supra note 31, at 581. See also Note, supra note 29, at 1308 (when
combined with a fundamental right or suspect class, morality is an insufficient
justification).
87. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
88. Id. at 1202.
89. Id.
90. 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1142 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
91. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292.
92. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
93. Id. at 512.
94. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 n.3, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 n.3
(1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
95. Id. at 489, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
96. 490 Pa. 91, 96, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (1986).




unacceptable" provided a rational justification for Georgia's sod-
omy law.9 8 The dissents, however, criticized the Court's meager
treatment of the issue. The duration of a majority's belief should
not mandate continued legislation. Rather, "we should be espe-
cially sensitive to the rights of those whose choices upset the ma-
jority."9 9 In addition, the state must advance some secular
justification beyond its assertion that homosexual conduct has tra-
ditionally been proscribed by Judeo-Christian values.' 0 0
B. Preservation of Marriage and Protection of Minors
The preservation of marriage has met with little success as a
justification often proposed by states to uphold sodomy statutes.
The government has argued that if sodomy were decriminalized,
the wide acceptance of homosexuality and hence the increase in its
incidence, would eventually lead to the disintegration of the insti-
tution of marriage and family.101 The court in both Onofre 102 and
Bonadio 10 3 rejected this reasoning. Likewise, when the Texas Pe-
nal Code revision committee discussed decriminalizing sodomy,
they placed little significance on the suggestion that decriminaliza-
tion would weaken the family structure.104 There is no support
for the reasoning that eliminating sodomy statutes will increase
the incidence of homosexual relationships and consequently de-
crease the number of heterosexual marriages.' 05 In fact, the non-
enforcement of fornication and adultery statutes and the increas-
ing prevalence of divorce and single parentage in American society
does more to undermine the institution of marriage than does the
nonenforcement of sodomy statutes. 0 6 Therefore, the state's in-
terest in preserving the institution of marriage does not justify
state regulation of sodomy.
98. 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).
99. 106 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2857 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. Note, supra note 29, at 1307.
102. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941 (1980) ("[The
records] are devoid of any support for the statement that a prohibition against con-
sensual sodomy will promote or protect the institution of marriage .... "), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
103. 490 Pa. 91, 95, 415 A.2d 47, 49-50 (1980) ("[It is nugatory to suggest that [the
statute] promotes a state interest in the institution of marriage.") See also Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dis-
senting) ("To suggest ... that the prohibition of homosexual conduct will in some
manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent the dissolution of ex-
isting ones is unworthy of judicial response."), qffd mem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
104. Von Beitel, supra note 26, at 48.
105. See Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1205; Pearson, supra note 19, at 857.
106. See Pearson, supra note 19, at 857. Cf. Note, supra note 29, at 1307.
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Another reason offered to support sodomy statutes is the pro-
tection of minors.10 7 Evidence suggests, however, that the large
majority of sexual offenses against children are heterosexual in
nature, not homosexual.108 Child abuse statutes, and laws against
statutory rape and the corruption of minors, are a more effective
and narrowly drawn means of addressing the problem than are
sodomy statutes.10 9 Therefore, neither the preservation of mar-
riage nor the protection of minors sufficiently justifies upholding
sodomy statutes.
C. Health
A final reason advanced for the existence of sodomy statutes
is to protect participants in certain sexual practices from physical
injury or from the spread of venereal diseases. The state is em-
powered by the Constitution to enact health and quarantine laws
to protect the health of its citizens. 110 Within this power falls the
right to prevent the spread of contagious or infectious diseases.11
Arguments supporting sodomy statutes under a public health
rationale are weak and seldom accepted by the courts. There is no
proof that physical injury is a consequence of sodomy.112 In addi-
tion, several factors tend to discredit sodomy statutes as a rational
means of preventing sexually transmitted diseases. Sodomy stat-
utes are both over and underinclusive. They prohibit lesbian sex-
ual contact and monogamous gay relationships, neither of which
promote venereal disease. 113 More importantly, they do not pro-
hibit the primary means of communicating sexually transmitted
diseases: promiscuous heterosexual contact. Even fornication stat-
utes are not enforced for health purposes."l 4 Furthermore, sodomy
statutes may actually contribute to the spread of venereal disease
rather than deter it; homosexuals are reluctant to seek treatment
for fear of prosecution and less likely to give the names of others
who may need treatment."x5
107. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130-31 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986); Von Beitel, supra note
26, at 43-44, 49.
108. Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1130. See also Pearson, supra note 19, at 857.
109. See Pearson, supra note 19, at 857.
110. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 205 (1824).
111. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877).
112. See People v, Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 489, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951, 415 N.E.2d
936, 941 (1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (no proof of physical injury had
been offered).
113. See Richards, supra note 29, at 986 n.127; Note, The Constitutionality of
Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1613, 1632 (1974).
114. Pearson, supra note 19, at 856.
115. See Richards, supra note 29, at 986 n.127; Note, supra note 113, at 1632.
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Since the state holds the power to enact public health laws
separate from the criminal law, using the criminal law to prevent
the spread of venereal diseases is superfluous. It only serves as
punishment for individual behaviors rather than as an answer to a
serious medical crisis. Therefore, although public health is a legiti-
mate state interest, sodomy laws are not a rational means of allevi-
ating the problem of sexually transmitted diseases.
As of 1981, a new element to the health concern has arisen:
AIDS. Since a great majority of the victims of AIDS are gay
men,1i6 proponents of the criminalization of sodomy, under the
pretext of preventing the spread of AIDS, have urged the contin-
ued enforcement, or reinstatement of sodomy statutes. 117 After ex-
ploring the mysteries surrounding the AIDS epidemic and the
recent developments in AIDS research, the next section examines
and rejects both criminal law and public health proposals as solu-
tions to the AIDS problem and proposes a third, more effective, re-
sponse: education.
V. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome and Sodomy Statutes
A. AIDS-The Epidemic
In 1981, physicians in Los Angeles first noticed the appear-
ance of a rare pneumonia, pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP),
in a striking number of young gay men.1 18 At approximately the
same time a rare cancer called Kaposi's sarcoma was diagnosed in
a large number of male homosexuals in New York.11 9 In-depth
study and interviews resulted in the identification of AIDS.
While research initially centered on homosexual men in the Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and New York areas, physicians soon dis-
covered that the disease was not limited to that group. A number
of Haitians in Florida developed the same symptoms.1 20 In addi-
tion, a significant number of intravenous drug users sharing un-
sterilized needles, hemophiliacs using Factor VIII concentrate to
116. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 144-152 and accompanying text.
118. See CDC, Pneumocystic Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MMWR 250 (1981).
Five cases of PCP, all in young, gay men was an extremely unusual occurrence.
119. See CDC, Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystic Pneumonia Among Homo-
sexual Men, 25 MMWR 305 (1981).
120. See, CDC, Opportunistic Infections and Kaposi's Sarcoma Among Haitians
in the United States, 31 MMWR 353 (1982). As of May, 1985, the CDC removed
Haitians from the list of high risk groups. Most of the Haitian cases have been
traced to homosexual or heterosexual contact with AIDS carriers or an exposure to
contaminated needles. Those cases which could not be classified due to lack of in-
formation were placed in the unknown group. Update, supra note 4, at 247-48. Cf.
Fettner & Check, supra note 3, at 104-21.
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control bleeding, and patients receiving blood transfusions within
the last several years, all developed AIDS.121 Other persons who
have contracted AIDS in significant numbers include children of
parents with AIDS and spouses or sexual partners of those with
AIDS.122
While the origin of AIDS remains a mystery,123 scientists fi-
nally discovered the cause of AIDS after years of diligent research.
In 1983 in Paris, and in 1984 in the United States, scientists iso-
lated a virus thought to be the cause of AIDS.124 It is known as
either lymphademopathy-associated virus (LAV), human T-cell
lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III), or the most recent
designation, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).125
The AIDS virus weakens the body's built-in immune sys-
121. See CDC, Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Pa-
tients with Hemophilia, 31 MMWR 644 (1982); CDC, Possible Transfusion-Associ-
ated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-California, 31 MMWR 652
(1982).
122. See CDC, Unexplained Immunodeficiency and Opportunistic Infections in
Infants--New York, New Jersey, California, 31 MMWR 665 (1982); CDC, Immu-
nodeficiency among Female Sexual Partners of Males with Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Sydrome (ADS)-New York, 31 MMWR 697 (1983). See also Fettner &
Check, supra note 3, at 146-66. While the number of AIDS cases are rapidly in-
creasing, they have generally increased proportionally within these high risk
groups.
123. The theory most often proposed is that of the African/Haitian link.
Kaposi's sarcoma and certain types of lymphoma are deadly in various parts of Af-
rica, chiefly Zaire. Though the form of AIDS found in the United States has only
recently appeared in Africa, it has been suggested that a strain of the AIDS virus
has been dormant in Africa for a number of years or has been acquired from
monkeys through unsanitary living conditions and cooking facilities. Fettner &
Check, supra note 3, at 202-07. The discovery of an AIDS-related virus in humans
similar to that found in African green monkeys seems to support this theory. Min-
neapolis Star & Trib., Mar. 27, 1986, at 6B, col. 1.
When Zaire became independent, many Haitians were hired to fill vacant em-
ployment positions. These Haitians later returned either to Haiti or instead to the
United States. It is posssible that some homosexual men were exposed to AIDS
while vacationing in Haiti and brought it back to the United States. This is only
one explanation for the sudden emergence of AIDS in the United States. See
Fettner & Check, supra note 3, at 122.
124. See F. Barr-Sinoussi, J.C. Chermann, F. Rey, M.T. Nugeyre, S. Chamaret,
J. Gruest, C. Dauguet, C. Axler-Blin, F. Vezinet-Brun, C. Rouzioux, W. Rozenbaum
& L. Montagnier, Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk
for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 Science 868 (1983); Robert
Gallo, Syed Salahuddin, Mikulas Popovic, Gene Shearer, Mark Kaplan, Barton
Haynes, Thomas Palker, Robert Redfield, James Oleske, Bijan Safai, Gilbert White,
Paul Foster & Phillip Markham, Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic
Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224 Sci-
ence 500 (1984).
125. John Coffin, Ashley Haase, Jay Levy, Luc Montagnier, Steven Oroszlan,
Natalie Teich, Howard Temin, Kumao Toyoshima, Harold Varmus, Peter Vogt &
Robin Weiss, Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 232 Science 697 (1986).
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tern126 to such an extent that the body can no longer fight certain
opportunistic infections127 and rare cancers which it is normally
able to resist.128 Research indicates that the virus cannot be com-
municated through casual contact.129 Although HTLV-III has
been isolated in blood, semen, urine, breast milk, tears, and sa-
liva,130 transmission of the virus itself through saliva and tears has
126. Within our immune system are special white blood cells called lymphocytes,
which are divided into two groups: B-cells and T-cells. The AIDS virus primarily
affects the T-cells. In a person unaffected by AIDS, the T-cell ratio (the number of
T-4 cells (helpers) to T-8 cells (suppressors)) is 2:1. In persons with AIDS, the ratio
is reversed or in some cases the helper cells are completely gone. Fettner & Check,
supra note 3, at 48-49. The AIDS virus invades the T-4 cells yet may remain dor-
mant for years. When activated, the virus replicates itself and eventually destroys
the T-4 cells. Id. Many healthy people at risk for AIDS already possess a weakened
immune system in which the T-cell ratio is 1:1. For example, homosexual males
have generally been subject to a high incidence of sexually transmitted diseases,
particularly those men who exhibit a high degree of promiscuity. This repeated ex-
posure tends to deplete the immune system. Also, narcotics have been known to
cause immune defects in I.V. drug users. Hemophiliacs, organ transplant recipients,
and cancer patients may also have depressed immune systems as a result of treat-
ment for their conditions. Cf. Gong, supra note 1, at 78-79. A previously depressed
immune system may be a possible factor in activating the AIDS virus. Id.
127. An "opportunistic infection" is "an infection caused by a microorganism
that may be common in the environment but causes disease only in a host with a
poorly functioning immune system." Gong, supra note 1, at 209.
128. AIDS victims are subject to a variety of infectious conditions, any of which
can be fatal. Cytomegalovirus (CMV), Epstein-Barr Virus (EBV), several herpes
simplex viruses, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), toxoplasmosis, various
bacterial infections, candidiasis, cryptococcus, Kaposi's sarcoma, and lymphoma are
a few of the typical conditions found in AIDS patients. See Gong, supra note 1, at
40-74. Early symptoms of AIDS-related complex (ARC), which may or may not
lead to AIDS, are swollen glands, severe fatigue, persistent fevers or night sweats,
persistent diarrhea, and weight loss. Id. at 30, 36-39. Persons who are seropositive-
who react positively to tests for HTLV-III antibodies in the blood stream-may
show no symptoms and may never develop ARC or AIDS. Earlier research on gay
men indicated that each year 5-10% of healthy seropositive men will develop ARC
and 5-10% of those with ARC will develop full-blown AIDS. Morton Hunt, Team-
ing up Against AIDS, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, (Magazine), at 42, 78. More re-
cently, however, the Public Health Service has predicted that 20-30% of persons
infected with the AIDS virus will develop AIDS by 1991. Coolfont Report, supra
note 4, at 343.
129. See Fettner & Check, supra note 3, at 158-59. See also Gerald Friedland,
Brian Saltzman, Martha Rogers, Patricia Kahl, Martin Lesser, Marguerite Mayers
& Robert Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV Infection to Household
Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis,
314 New Eng. J. Med. 344 (1986) (risk of horizontal transmission of HTLV-III to
nonsexual household contacts of patients with AIDS or ARC is minimal to nonexis-
tent); Jonathan Mann, Thomas Quinn, Henry Francis, Nzila Nzilambi, Ngaly
Bosenge, Kapita Bila, Joseph McCormick, Kalisa Ruti, Pangu Kaza Asila & James
Curran, Prevalence of HTLV-III/LAV in Household Contacts of Patients with Con-
firmed AIDS and Controls in Kinshasa, Zaire, 256 J. A.M.A. 721 (1986) (transmnis-
sion of HTLV-III/LAV between AIDS cases and household members, other than
spouses, occurs rarely if at all); Merle Sande, Transmission of AIDS: The Case
Against Casual Contagion, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 380 (1986).
130. CDC, Summary: Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infec-
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not been documented.13' The AIDS virus is transmitted chiefly
through sexual contact, primarily, though certainly not exclu-
sively, through receptive anal intercourse. 3 2 The virus is also
communicated through exposure to blood or blood products, and
from mother to child during the perinatal period.133
A critical advancement in AIDS research has been the devel-
opment of a blood test known as ELISA34 specifically for AIDS.
This test indicates the level of HTLV-III antibody in the blood
stream.135 Though scientists developed this test primarily to assist
in eliminating AIDS-contaminated blood from the nation's blood
supply,136 the test has been the sole basis of the military's refusal
tion with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus in the Workplace, 34 MMWR 681, 682 (1985). See also Jerome Groopman, S.
Zaki Salahuddin, M.G. Sarngadharan, Phillip Markham, Matthew Gonda, Ann
Sliski & Robert Gallo, HTL V-II in Saliva of People with AIDS-Related Complex
and Healthy Homosexual Men at Risk for AIDS, 226 Science 447 (1984); David Ho,
Roy Byington, Robert Schooley, Theresa Flynn, Teresa Rota & Martin Hirsch, In-
frequency of Isolation of HTLV-II Virus from Saliva in AIDS, 313 New Eng. J.
Med. 1606 (1985).
131. CDC, Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus, 34 MMWR 517,
518 (1985); David Lyman, Warren Winkelstein, Michael Ascher & Jay Levy, Mini-
mal Risk of Transmission of AIDS-Associated Retrovirus Infection by Oral Genital
Contact, 255 J. A.M.A 1703 (1986) (men who had no sexual partners or who only
engaged in oral-genital contact showed significantly less risk of AIDS virus infec-
tion than men engaging in anal intercourse); Sande, supra note 129, at 381 (no evi-
dence that disease is spread by kissing or oral intercourse). Transmission is possible
through oral intercourse usually only if the mouth has been bleeding or contains
sores. See Fettner & Check, supra note 3.
132. Anal intercourse and certain other sexual practices of male homosexuals
tend to tear the lining of the rectum and allow the virus to pass from semen into
the blood stream. Fettner & Check, supra note 3, at 90. Despite the numbers of
AIDS cases stemming from such activities, reports of heterosexual transmission of
the virus are also on the increase. AIDS victims who possess no high risk factors
generally acquired AIDS through contact with either a prostitute, a spouse with
AIDS, or an I.V. drug user. See CDC, Heterosexual Transmission of Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type IIIlLymphadenopathy-Associated-Virus, 34 MMWR 561
(1985) [hereinafter Heterosexual Transmission]; Robert Redfield, Phillip Markham,
Syed Zaki Salahuddin, D. Craig Wright, M.G. Sarngadharan & Robert Gallo, Heter-
osexually Acquired HTL V-II1/LAV Disease (AIDS-Related Complex and AIDS), 254
J. A.M.A. 2094 (1985) [hereinafter Redfield]. While HTLV-III has been isolated
from semen, there have been no reports of the virus in vaginal secretions. Conse-
quently, the actual mechanism for transmission of the virus from males-to-females
and specifically from females-to-males is not known. It is evident, however, that
receptive anal intercourse is not necessary for heterosexual transmission. Id. at
2096.
133. Heterosexual Transmission, supra note 132, at 561.
134. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.
135. Fettner & Check, supra note 3, at 173.
136. Id. at 173. Since the ELISA test was developed to eliminate potentially in-
fectious units of blood from the nation's blood supply and was not intended to be
diagnostic, the test is likely to engender the smallest number of false negative re-
sults as possible. Michael Osterholm, Robert Bowman, Michael Chopek, J. Jeffrey
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to accept recruits and to assign isolation and medical disability to
present personnel solely on the basis of antibody testing.137 Em-
ployers and insurance companies have also sought to use the test
to evaluate applicants and to assess liability for future medical
costs of employees and insureds afflicted with AIDS.138
At the present time, there is no cure for AIDS. Research
currently focuses on two areas: developing a vaccine to prevent
AIDS infection and testing therapeutic agents in an attempt to in-
hibit deterioration and allow regeneration of the immune system.
Scientists have taken significant steps in developing a vaccine.
They have not only identified the genome structure of the AIDS
McCullough, Jack Korlath & Herbert Polesky, Sounding Board: Screening
Donated Blood and Plasma for HTLV-Ill Antibody, 312 New Eng. J. Med. 1185,
1186 (1985) [hereinafter Osterholm]. See also George Lundberg, The Age of AIDS: A
Great Time for Defensive Living, 253 J. A.M.A. 3440 (1985). Although both the
specificity and sensitivity of the test range from 93 to 99%, the possibility of false
positive results from only one ELISA testing is phenomenal. See Osterholm, supra,
at 1186. Given a geographic region where the prevalance of the virus is very low,
e.g. 0.01%, it is possible that 98% of the tests will result in false positives. Lund-
berg, supra, at 3440. Even with repeated ELISA testing, the chances are very great
that a false positive outcome will result. When the Red Cross retested 2,552 repeat-
edly ELISA positive blood samples with the more effective Western blot test, only
587 samples remained positive. Charles Marwick, Blood Banks Give HTLV-III Test
Positive Appraisal at Five Months, 254 J. A.M.A. 1681 (1985). While the Red Cross
generally requires a Western blot test following a repeatedly positive ELISA test,
at other testing facilities, availability of an alternative test is limited. Marwick,
supra; Osterholm, supra, at 1186. See also Donald Burke & Robert Redfield, False-
Positive Western Blot Tests for Antibodies to HTLV-Ill, 256 J. A.M.A. 347 (1986)
(quality of Western blot testing "varies from substandard to excellent"). The ne-
cessity of using an additional test, such as the Western blot, to reduce the number
of false positives is evident. Therefore, although the ELISA test may free the blood
supply from blood containing AIDS antibodies, the ELISA test is an unreliable in-
dicator of those individuals who have been infected with the AIDS virus.
137. See Schneiderman, supra note 12, at 347. Since courts have held that the
military may reject or discharge individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation,
see, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, Miller v. Weinberger, 454 U.S. 855 (1981),
cert. denied, Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981), the ELISA test essentially
serves as a more "reliable" method of removing gays from the armed services.
A group from the El Paso County Health Department reported that a combina-
tion of positive tests for certain infectious conditions, including AIDS, could be used
as indicator of sexual orientation in men. John Potterat, John Muth & Gary Mar-
kewich, Serological Markers as Indicators of Sexual Orientation in AIDS Virus-In-
fected Men, 256 J. A.M.A. 712 (1986). Although the purpose of their "actuarial
method" was to identify risk factors in persons belonging to the unknown group,
the possible repercussions of the approach are obvious.
138. See Mervyn Silverman & Deborah Silverman, AIDS and the Threat to Pub-
lic Health, 15 Hastings Center Rep. 19 (Supp. Aug. 1985). California, Florida, Wis-
consin, Maine, and the District of Columbia in some manner prohibit serological
testing as a method of screening employees and/or insurance applicants. See Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 199.21(c) (West 1985); D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2805 (Supp.
1986); Fla. Stat. § 381.616(5) (1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 17001-17006 (Supp.
1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 146.025 (West 1985).
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virus, specifically genes which are essential for HTLV-III replica-
tion,139 but have also experimented with recombinant vaccinia vi-
ruses resulting in the generation of T-cells and the production of
antibodies against the AIDS virus.140 Nevertheless, a vaccine will
help only those not yet infected with the AIDS virus. For the
thousands with AIDS, and the countless numbers infected with
the virus, antiviral drugs, including azidothymidine (AZT), have
proved promising in repressing the virus and its accompanying op-
portunistic infections.'41 Long range projections set the year 2000
as the goal for eliminating transmission of the virus.142 In the
meantime, it is evident that something must be done to stop the
spread of this deadly virus.
B. AIDS-The Criminal Law
Since the earliest days of English common law, the criminal
law has played a significant role in the regulation of private sexual
conduct. Through increased public awareness and an expanded in-
terpretation of constitutional liberties, however, legislatures have
begun to acknowledge the inappropriateness of regulating private
sexual conduct through the criminal law. Although much of mod-
ern society has matured into a somewhat grudging tolerance of ho-
mosexuality, homophobia remains the prime motivating factor in
discrimination based upon participation in private consensual ho-
mosexual sodomy. Consequently, certain legislatures have at-
tempted to prevent the criminal law from reinforcing homophobic
stereotypes by decriminalizing sodomy and restoring to homosexu-
als constitutional rights that long went unrecognized. 143
Nevertheless, the AIDS crisis has given opponents of gay
rights new ground on which to stand. Claiming that AIDS is "just
what they deserve," the criminalization of sodomy is justified as
necessary to prevent AIDS from spreading to the heterosexual
population. In several recent cases, AIDS has been offered as a
justification for sodomy statutes. Although the state declined to
139. See Amanda Fisher, Mark Feinberg, Steven Josephs, Mary Harper, Lisa
Marselle, Gregory Reyes, Matthew Gonda, Anna Aldovini, Christine Debouk, Rob-
ert Gallo & Flossie Wong-Staal, The Trans-Activator Gene of HTL V-III is Essential
for Virus Replication, 320 Nature 376 (1986).
140. See Joyce Zarling, William Morton, Patricia Moran, Jan McClure, Steven
Kosowski & Shiu-Lok Hu, T-cell Responses to Human AIDS Virus in Macaques Im-
munized with Recombinant Vaccinia Viruses, 323 Nature 344 (1986).
141. See Walter Dowdle, The Search for an AIDS Vaccine, 101 Pub. Health Reps.
232, 232-33 (1986); Karen Wright, First Tentative Signs of Therapeutic Promise, 323
Nature 283 (1986).
142. Coolfont Report, supra note 4, at 341.
143. See supra notes 8, 24 and accompanying text.
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file an appeal from the lower court's decision to strike down
Texas' sodomy statute, 144 a group known as Dallas Doctors
Against AIDS attempted to reopen the case to introduce proof that
"'the public health and safety of all citizens of Texas will be
harmed if the spread of AIDS is not stopped'.. .and that [the sod-
omy statute] is desperately needed to combat the AIDS men-
ace." 145 Though the lower court rejected this argument, found that
the state's evidence was not newly discovered, and indicated that
the legislature had not considered the AIDS problem when passing
the Texas sodomy statute,146 it is distinctly possible that the circuit
court contemplated the AIDS question when reversing the lower
court's decision.
In the Hardwick case, both the state's brief filed in support of
Georgia's sodomy statute and an amicus brief filed by Professor
David Robinson, Jr. of George Washington Law School suggested
to the Supreme Court that the AIDS epidemic would be a compel-
ling justification for retaining sodomy statutes. 147 In particular,
Robinson's brief argued that states should be allowed "to reassert
traditional values" and proscribe "potentially lethal behavior."148
Nevertheless, the Court did not directly address the AIDS ques-
tion,149 but rather accepted the state's morality justification in up-
holding the statute.150 In State v. Walsh, however, the Missouri
Supreme Court based its decision not only on Hardwick's affirma-
tion of morality as a permissible state goal, but on the state's inter-
est in inhibiting the spread of AIDS.l s ' Clearly, the possibility
exists for further exploitation of the AIDS epidemic as an excuse
to reinstate sodomy statutes in states which have long since pro-
moted decriminalization. 1 52
144. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
145. Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526, 529 (N.D. Tex. 1985), supplementing 553 F.
Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3337 (1986).
146. Id. at 534. But see State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. 1986) ("That
AIDS was not discovered until after the enactment of [the Missouri sodomy statute]
does not affect its present validity.")
147. See Brief for Petitioner at 37 & Brief for David Robinson, Jr. as Amicus Cu-
riae at 23-28, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (No. 85-140).
148. Brief for David Robinson, Jr. at 5.
149. The only subtle reference to AIDS was relegated to a footnote in the dissent
discussing the disputable connection between sodomy and harms alleged in the
briefs presented to the Court. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2853 n.3 (1986) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
150. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
151. Walsh, 173 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. 1986).
152. Two legislators from New Mexico proposed the introduction of a bill to
recriminalize sodomy, claiming that the statute was necessary to prevent the spread
of AIDS. Arthur Leonard, Other Miscellaneous Gay/Lesbian Law Notes, 1986 Les-
bian/Gay L. Notes 5. In addition, a promising gay rights bill was defeated in Massa-
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Government regulation of private consensual sodomy,
whatever the reason, is a remnant of the past. Both legislatures
and courts have begun to support homosexuals' right to engage in
private sexual activity. 153 With gender now designated as a quasi-
suspect class,154 the next logical step is to award that same prefer-
ence to classifications based on sexual orientation. 55 Laws abridg-
ing those rights or regulating that class, including sodomy laws,
must be necessary for, or at least substantially related to, an im-
portant state interest to uphold the regulation.
Granted, the state's interest in stopping the transmission of
AIDS is a compelling one. Nevertheless, sodomy statutes are not
tailored to serve that purpose. First and foremost, sodomy statutes
simply do not deter sodomy. They have not in the past, and are
not likely to do so in the future. Educating the population to avoid
unsafe sexual practices, 156 in combination with the fear of con-
tracting AIDS, is a more powerful deterrent to the spread of
AIDS. In California, where sodomy has been decriminalized,
many gays have radically changed their sexual behavior as a result
of the strong educational movement which has emerged since the
AIDS crisis began. A considerable drop in the rate of rectal gonor-
rhea evidences the promising trend.57 Self-imposed behavioral
changes have done much more to limit the spread of AIDS than
the sodomy statutes could ever accomplish.
chusetts partially as a result of the AIDS crisis. Arthur Leonard, Massachusetts
and Providence, RI, Reject Gay Rights Protection, 1985 Lesbian/Gay L. Notes 42.
Since the Massachusetts Supreme Court had declared the bill constitutional, its
promoters were fairly confident of passage. The link between the gay community
and AIDS evidently aroused the homophobia of gay rights opponents, defeating the
bill.
153. See supra note 24.
154. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
155. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
156. Unsafe sexual practices include both receptive and insertive anal inter-
course without a condom, manual-anal intercourse preceded or followed by an ex-
change of semen, fellatio, oral-anal contact, and vaginal intercourse without a
condom. Scientific Affairs Committee of the Bay Area Physicians for Human
Rights, Guidelines for AIDS Risk Reduction (1984) [hereinafter Guidelines].
157. The rate of rectal gonorrhea has fallen more than 75%. AIDS: What is to be
Done?, Harper's, Oct. 1985, at 39, 45. See also Office of Technology Assessment's
Findings on the Public Health Services Response to AIDS: Joint Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations and the House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1985). Several studies have
indicated a decline in the number of sexual partners and the frequency of unsafe
sexual behavior in a significant number of gay males. See CDC, Self-Reported Be-
havioral Changes Among Gay and Bisexual Men-San Francisco, 34 MMWR 613
(1985); Leon McKusick, William Horstman & Thomas Coates, AIDS and Sexual Be-
havior Reported by Gay Men in San Francisco, 75 Am. J. Pub. Health 493 (1985);




Using sodomy statutes to prevent AIDS, like the prevention
of venereal disease, is overinclusive. The language of sodomy stat-
utes generally prohibits sodomy by those who have not been in-
fected with the AIDS virus and those who do not engage in high
risk behaviors. For example, most statutes apply to lesbian and
monogamous gay male couples who practice sodomy, neither of
which are a high risk for contracting or transmitting AIDS. Safe
sexual practices between both homosexual and heterosexual
couples are also prohibited by sodomy statutes.1 58 These behaviors
also present a limited risk in the spread of AIDS.
Sodomy statutes as a method of preventing the transmission
of AIDS are also underinclusive. While at the present time the
primary method of communicating the virus is through receptive
anal intercourse,15 9 in a growing number of AIDS cases the virus
has been transmitted through penile-vaginal intercourse, sexual
conduct obviously not prohibited by sodomy statutes.16 0 Sodomy
statutes also do not prevent the spread of AIDS through the sec-
ond most frequent means of transmission: the sharing of unster-
ilized needles. Though the state may take corrective measures one
step at a time, the broad use of sodomy statutes raises further
questions on how far the state can go in inhibiting individual
liberty.161
Another problem, also raised in the context of other sexually
transmitted diseases, is that sodomy statutes may in fact be
counterproductive to a solution to the AIDS epidemic.162 The ille-
gality of homosexual sexual relationships may compel many gays
158. Safe sexual practices include anal intercourse with a condom and cunnilin-
gus. See Guidelines, supra note 156. One study has proven that the AIDS virus can-
not pass through condoms. Marcus Conant, Denise Hardy, Judith Sernatinger, D.
Spicer & J.A. Levy, Condoms Prevent Transmission of AIDS-Associated Retrovirus,
255 J. A.M.A. 1706 (1986). The efficacy of condoms, however, depends in part on
their proper use, including their application at the appropriate time and with
proper care, and the additional use of lubricant and spermicide. Keith Henry &
Kent Crossley, Condoms and the Prevention of AIDS, 256 J. A.M.A. 1442 (1986).
159. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
161. The lower court in Baker v. Wade raised some of these problematic
questions:
[I]f prohibiting private, consensual homosexual conduct will effectively
combat AIDS, should the State of Texas also ban private, consensual
heterosexual acts by Haitians, hemophiliacs and drug addicts? ... [Ihf
any criminal statute is "justified," shouldn't it be "narrowly drawn" to
prohibit those persons who know that they have AIDS (whether
homosexuals, Haitians, hemophiliacs, or drug addicts) from either hav-
ing sexual contacts or donating blood?
106 F.R.D. 526, 535 (N.D. Tex. 1985), supplementing 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex.
1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
162. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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to seek multiple, anonymous sexual encounters with little protec-
tion against the spread of disease. It is precisely this type of be-
havior, in either homosexuals or heterosexuals, which fosters the
spread of AIDS. In addition, sodomy's illegality may inhibit accu-
rate reporting of AIDS cases and hinder cooperation with health
authorities for research and treatment.163 Moreover, sodomy stat-
utes tend to reinforce the mistaken belief that homosexuals are re-
sponsible for the AIDS epidemic and consequently encourages the
incidence of discrimination against gays.164
Therefore, sodomy statutes as a means of preventing the
transmission of AIDS are ineffective, overinclusive, and only serve
to punish an unpopular behavior, rather than control a deadly epi-
demic. The criminal law, in the form of sodomy statutes, acts only
to perpetutate homophobia and cannot replace adequate public
health measures to prevent the spread of AIDS.
C. AIDS-Public Health Measures
Apart from invoking sodomy statutes, state governments can
use their police power to utilize several public health measures to
attempt to stop the spread of the AIDS virus. In judging whether
such regulation is legitimate, courts have developed several consid-
erations to use when analyzing public health statutes:
(1) Does the state have a duty to protect the public health?
(2) Is that duty a legitimate legislative subject?
(3) Does the health statute under consideration bear a ra-
tional and direct relationship to the objective?
(4) Is the statute arbitrary or capricious?
(5) If legislative classification results, is that classification ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest?
(6) Does the sweep of the statute go beyond what is required
to achieve the objective?
(7) Is either a suspect classification or a fundamental right
involved?165
In the past, courts have upheld regulations ranging from reporting
requirements to involuntary physical examinations.166
163. Studies have shown that societies which impose severe penalties for sodomy
have a poorer record of reporting and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.
David G. Ostrow & Norman Altman, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Homosex-
uality, 10 Sexually Transmitted Diseases 208, 212 (1983). Moreover, unless a guar-
antee of complete confidentiality is given, accurate AIDS research will be
impossible or ineffective. See Lawrence Brouse, HTLV-III Transmission, 254 J.
A.M.A. 2130, 2131 (1985).
164. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
165. Catherine Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through the Law, 15 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 801, 805 (1982).
166. See id. at 806-13. Courts have permitted mandatory immunization for small
pox whether or not there is evidence of an epidemic. See Jacobson v. Massachu-
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One of the state's drastic means of limiting the transmission
of AIDS, and that most akin to sodomy statutes, is the compulsory
closing of gay bathhouses. Public health officials claim that bath-
house patrons engage in the type and frequency of sexual activity
which spreads the AIDS virus.167 Though some owners have vol-
untarily closed their bathhouses, the New York legislature enacted
a regulation which requires closing establishments that allow anal
intercourse and fellatio on the premises.168 In City of New York v.
New Saint Mark's Baths,16 9 the New York Supreme Court upheld
the closing of a gay bathhouse in spite of arguments that bath-
houses provide a "valuable communication link between public
health authorities and the homosexual community."'170
Although a high incidence of unsafe sexual practices take
place in gay bathhouses, bathhouses constitute an excellent forum
for educating those gay men most likely to be at risk of contracting
AIDS. Closing bathhouses only forces the patrons to seek alterna-
tive sites for their sexual activity rather than to take a positive
step toward changing attitudes and behavior necessary to halt the
transmission of AIDS. New York's focus on the gay community in
its effort to stop communication of the virus manifests the same
attitude which is apparent from the advocates of sodomy statutes:
control the unpopular behavior rather than the cause of the ill-
ness. In this way, the regulations go beyond the objectives they
are trying to achieve-that of suppressing the AIDS virus-and
impinge on individual fundamental rights of privacy and associa-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934). Courts
also allow quarantine of the diseased, carriers of the disease, and even those not yet
affected within an area if there is danger presented by the disease and a reasonable
suspicion that the area is infected. See In re Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 180 P. 644
(2d Dist. 1919); People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815
(1922). But see In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 195 P. 1077 (2d Dist. 1921) ("mere
suspicion" is not sufficient); and isolation of leprosy and tuberculosis victims. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247e (1980).
167. The Center for Disease Control recommends state regulation or closing of
establishments which "facilitate high risk behaviors... (e.g., bathhouses, houses of
prostitution, 'shooting galleries' [place where I.V. drug use occurs in abundance])."
CDC, Additional Recommendations to Reduce Sexual and Drug Abuse-Related
Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associ-
ated Virus, 35 MMWR 152, 154 (1986) [hereinafter Additional Recommendations].
168. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 24-2.1 to -2.3 (1985). San Francisco
also prohibits unsafe sexual contacts in its gay bathhouses. Silverman & Silverman,
supra note 138, at 22.
169. 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
170. Id. at 917, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 983. See also Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts,
642 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (AIDS provided a rationale for a Chatta-
nooga city ordinance licensing adult-oriented bookstores); State ex rel Slaton v.
Fleck & Assocs., 622 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (state action to close bathhouse
cannot be removed to federal court).
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tion. Ultimately, closing bathhouses will be as ineffective as sod-
omy statutes in the fight against AIDS.171
Another proposed health measure concerns the quarantine,
isolation, and/or involuntary hospitalization of AIDS carriers to
prevent communication of the virus. In Cordero v. Coughlin,172
the district court upheld the segregation of prisoners affected by
AIDS.1 73 Within those restricted circumstances, the court found
that prison officials had broad discretion to act, while prisoners re-
tained only "a narrow range of protected liberty interests."17 4
While several states have proposed plans to quarantine AIDS pa-
tients outside the prison system, 7 5 the United States Conference
of Local Health Officers has advised against such an action.' 7 6 The
quarantine of AIDS victims, or even virus carriers, does not serve
to treat or control the virus. Since AIDS is not communicable
through casual contact, isolating victims or carriers from persons
uninfected with the virus is unnecessary. Furthermore, the inabil-
ity of researchers to pinpoint the time at which AIDS virus carri-
ers become infectious and the near impossibility of terminally ill
AIDS patients transmitting the virus make narrowly drawn quar-
antine regulations difficult, if not impossible, to draft and en-
force. 7 7 Indefinite quarantine, most likely enduring for the life of
the victim, would undoubtedly implicate an unconstitutional depri-
vation of liberty. Consequently, a general quarantine of all virus
carriers would be arbitrary and capricious, and the isolation of in-
dividual victims would serve no purpose other than harassment.
171. For a detailed constitutional analysis of this topic, see Stephen Collier,
Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses:
A Constitutional Analysis, 15 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 301 (1985); Judith Rabin, The
AIDS Epidemic and Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 10 J. Health Pol.
Pol'y & L. 729 (1986).
172. 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
173. Id. Cf. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1985).
174. 607 F. Supp. at 10 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469 (1982)).
175. See Chris Nichols, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality?, 11 J.
Contemp. L. 315, 340 (1984); Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1275, 1281 (1986). A group known as PANIC (Prevent AIDS Now
Initiative Committee) placed Proposition 64 on California's November ballot. Prop-
osition 64 was an initiative which extended "existing public health codes for com-
municable diseases to AIDS and AIDS virus carriers." The proposition would have
made state quarantine and isolation statutes available to combat AIDS. Joseph
Palca, Proposition Causes PANIC, 323 Nature 384 (1986). Fortunately, however, the
initiative was soundly defeated. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1986, at 19, col. 4.
176. Minneapolis Star & Trib., Jan. 22, 1986, at 10A, col. 1. The Public Health
Service recommends temporary involuntary isolation of those AIDS carriers who
refuse to discontinue high risk behaviors "only in rare circumstances and after due
process." Coolfont Report, supra note 4, at 347.




Finally, typical public health measures include mandatory
blood testing, case reporting, and contact tracing. The Public
Health Service presently encourages persons engaging in high risk
activity to voluntarily submit themselves for serological testing. 78
While such testing may serve the function of making individuals
aware of the hazards of high risk behavior to themselves and their
contacts, mandatory testing by employers or insurance companies
can only serve as a tool for discriminatory purposes; it will not pre-
vent the transmission of the AIDS virus. Compulsory testing en-
courages the substitution of an assumed behavior for a positive test
result and consequently, discrimination on the basis of that
behavior.
While most states require physicians and blood banks to re-
port only CDC-defined AIDS cases to the Public Health Service, 79
Idaho and Colorado require reporting the names, along with other
pertinent data, of persons with seropositive test results and author-
ize tracing the sexual contacts of virus carriers.'8 0 Moreover,
blood banks keep records of seropositive blood donors. Questions
of confidentiality arise when these names are placed on lists possi-
bly accessible to insurance companies, employers, and the military.
California, Florida, Maine, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia
expressly protect the confidentiality of blood test results against
use by employers and insurance companies.' 8 ' A Florida court in
South Florida Blood Service v. Rasmussen ' 8 2 protected blood do-
nors' interests in confidentiality in an action by a transfusion re-
cipient who died from AIDS as a result of a virus-infected
transfusion. The donors' privacy interests in combination with the
public's interest in the free access to donated blood outweighed the
178. Coo~font Report, supra note 4, at 347; Additional Recommendations, supra
note 167, at 153.
179. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 241.1 (1985). The CDC spec-
ifies certain conditions patients must manifest before being diagnosed as an AIDS
case. See CDC, Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-
United States, 31 MMWR 507 (1982); CDC, Revision of the Case Definition of Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting-United States, 34
MMWR 373 (1985).
The reporting form used by the CDC asks not only for the name, address, and
other necessary information, but for a history of sexual orientation and relation-
ships, prison record, and drug use. Joni Gray & Gary Melton, The Law and Ethics
of Psychosocial Research on AIDS, 64 Neb. L. Rev. 637, 654 n.113 (1985). The availa-
bility of such information heightens the need for confidentiality.
180. Idaho Code § 39-601 to -602 (1985 & Supp. 1986); 17 Colo. Regs. § 1004 (1985).
California's Proposition 64 would have authorized seropositive case reporting. See
supra note 175.
181. See statutes cited supra note 138. The military, however, has never been
prohibited from using blood tests for exclusionary purposes. See supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
182. 467 So.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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other party's interest in discovering the donors' names and ad-
dresses. 8 3 While this case may protect the names of blood donors
in a similar situation, there is no guarantee that anonymity will be
preserved for all test results. If employers and insurance compa-
nies are allowed access to lists, or are permitted to conduct mass
screenings of employees or policy holders, AIDS becomes not only
a health problem, but also a basis for discrimination. Accumulat-
ing the names of AIDS virus carriers is wholly unrelated to the ef-
fort to limit the communication of the virus. Although certain
vital statistics may be essential to researchers, the inclusion of
names only increases the possibility of their discriminatory misuse.
One solution to this problem is to establish alternative, anonymous
test sites. In this way, persons engaging in high risk behavior may
be tested for exposure to the virus without the loss of confidential-
ity and fear of recrimination. 8 4
Though primarily suggesting self-referral of an AIDS-in-
fected person's sexual and drug abuse contacts, the Public Health
Service has indicated that in some situations, notification and
counseling of contacts by health agencies may be appropriate. 8 5
Regardless of this recommendation, contact tracing is best left to
virus carriers on a voluntary basis or delegated to a private organi-
zation which would subsequently destroy the contacts' names. Un-
like contact tracing used to notify those possibly exposed to
venereal diseases, the possible harm engendered by the suggestion
of AIDS infection is more extreme. Granted, it is crucial for eve-
ryone to be made aware of their potential infection. Nevertheless,
the inherent bias against gays and the present association of AIDS
with gay men demand that seropositive test results be kept
confidential.
The most effective and least restrictive response to the AIDS
crisis is education. To eliminate transmission of the AIDS virus,
the heterosexual and homosexual communities must change both
their attitudes and behaviors. A conscious effort by all persons
whose behaviors place them at risk for AIDS to alter their behav-
iors in conformity with safe sex guidelines and recommendations
for the use of sterilized needles will help curb the spread of the
disease. In order for this to take place, accurate information must
be disseminated to the public.
Thus far, funding for education has been primarily directed
toward the professional: the researcher, the physician, and the
183. Id. at 804.
184. Silverman & Silverman, supra note 138, at 20.
185. Coolfont Report, supra note 4, at 347.
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health care worker. Comprehensive brochures and lectures on
safe sex procedures, and free distribution of condoms and steril-
ized needles are essential elements to an effective fight against
AIDS. In San Francisco, an active and explicit education campaign
has elicited positive behavioral changes.186 More concentrated ef-
forts must be initiated across the country to insure that everyone is
aware of current research developments and behavioral guidelines
upon which they should model their behavior. Recent Public
Health Service recommendations advocate national information
and education campaigns utilizing radio, television, and newspaper
and magazine ads to inform the public about AIDS and its trans-
mission.18 7 Even the Surgeon General has urged parents and
schools to introduce AIDS sex education "at the lowest grade pos-
sible."' 8 8 Education is the only public health measure precisely
ministering to the AIDS problem, while maintaining the constitu-
tionally protected rights, not only of gays, but of all persons af-
flicted with AIDS. In 1820, Thomas Jefferson wrote: "I know no
safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exer-
cise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not
to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by educa-
tion."189 Jefferson's words are equally applicable today.
VI. Conclusion
It is alarming that AIDS should strike so suddenly and so
devastatingly. It is unfortunate that AIDS is primarily concen-
trated in a group already suffering from hardship and prejudice.
But it is shocking that those who oppose homosexuality should use
the AIDS crisis as a means of furthering their predilections. The
court in Baker v. Wade raised the following question: "[I]f AIDS
can be wiped out by statutes such as [the Texas sodomy statute],
would the State consider passing laws against other diseases?"'190
Using the criminal law to punish those who may already suffer
from the guilt of having infected those they care for and who will
186. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
187. Coolfont Report, supra note 4, at 346. The Public Health Service and the
Red Cross have developed television public service announcements regarding AIDS
and the use of condoms. See CDC, Availability of Informational Material on AIDS,
35 MMWR 819 (1987).
188. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Surgeon General's Report on Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 5, 31 (1986).
189. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in
Letters of Thomas Jefferson 216, 218 (Frank Irwin ed. 1975).
190. 106 F.R.D. 526, 535 (N.D. Tex. 1985), supplementing 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.
Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
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more than likely die is ludicrous. Clarence Darrow aptly summa-
rized the irony and unproductivity of this type of thinking when
he quoted from a story by Samuel Butler entitled "Erehwon."191
It takes place in a village high in the mountains of New Zealand.
If a bank president had embezzled the funds of a bank, or if
some one else committed something that civilized people call
crime, such persons were not sent to jail or prison, but to a
"straightener," who treated the unfortunate one daily for a
suitable time, each day friends and relatives inquiring solici-
tously how the patient was getting along, displaying deep in-
terest in his progress, and showing great pleasure and
gratification when any one was cured. But if some one had a
disease he was at once sent to a criminal court. Mr. Jones, we
will say, is led into court charged with tuberculosis. The judge
asks him what he has to say for himself, and he replies that he
was born with a weak constitution, that he is poor and has
been forced to work in inclement weather and unventilated
surrounding, and so developed tuberculosis. Thereupon the
judge, with the judge's zeal for justice, turns over the pages of
his docket and says, "Mr. Jones, weren't you in this court a
year ago for pneumonia?" The poor fellow replies "Yes-" he
had been working in the rain and cold, and had not known
that it would cause pneumonia. The judge promptly replied
that ignorance was no excuse for crime. On further examina-
tion it was disclosed that he was once in court afflicted with a
severe cold; it was therefore clear that he was an habitual
criminal, and thereupon he was sent to prison for life.192
Punishing AIDS carriers, by means of sodomy statutes and other
public health measures modeled on the same premise, will only
criminalize its victims. It will not stop the AIDS epidemic. Only
diligent research, intensive education, and time can do that.
191. Nowhere spelled backwards.
192. Clarence Darrow, The Story of my Life 357-58 (1932), quoted in Baker v.
Wade, 106 F.R.D. at 535 n.27.
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